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Overview
• Online banking: Features and risks
» Phishing demo
» DNS cache poisoning demo
• FFIEC Guidance Overview
• Authentication methods
» Two-factor authentication
» Options for online banking
• Is two-factor authentication the correct approach?
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Online Banking: Features and 
Risks
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Why Online Financial Services?
• Online banking is fastest growing service on the 
World Wide Web
» All banks are the same size on the Web
» Consumers get 24/7/365 access to financial info
• We've all become bank tellers!
» Financial institutions are perceived as providing better 
customer service and save money
• Bank branch: $1.07/transaction
• Telephone banking: $0.55/transaction
• ATM machine: $0.27/transaction
• Internet banking: $0.01/transaction
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More Statistics...
• 40M online banking customers in U.S. in 4Q2005
» Up 27% from 4Q2004
• 36% increase in online bank bill payment 
customers in 2005
» Accounts for 25% of all online bill payments
» Bank of America has 5.1M active online bill payment 
customers (>50% of total)
» 37% of CitiBank's online banking customers use their 
online bill payment services; 34% of BofA customers
Source: comScore Networks
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Online Risks
• Phishing
• Malware
» Trojan horses, backdoors, rootkits, keyloggers
• Credential stealing attacks
• Channel breaking attacks
• Nigerian 419 and other scams
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Phishing
Phishing sites stay 
active an average of 
about 6 days
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DNS Cache Poisoning (Pharming)
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Credential Stealing Attack Scenarios
From Hiltgen, et al., 2006
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Channel Breaking Attack Scenarios
From Hiltgen, et al., 2006
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Prevalence of the Problem
"Phishing and Crimeware Map" from http://www.antiphishing.org/crimeware.html, 4/27/2006
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Nigerian 419 Scams
• These scams has evolved from letters to 
faxes to e-mails
» Timely, using names that are in the news
» Believable...
• To people with larceny in their hearts
• See http://www.bustedupcowgirl.com/scampage.html
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Impact on Consumers
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RESULTS:
• Loss of consumer confidence
• A lingering question of "why"?
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Motivation of the Bad Guy
• The old fashioned way
» Small gain, great risk 
» Victim can identify 
you
» Victim can fight back
» Police can chase you
» Gun enhancements
» Long prison terms
• Id. theft method
» High profit, low risk
» No victim contact
» No weapon use
» Police understaffed and 
overwhelmed
» Probation or misdemeanor 
-- if caught
» The loot is delivered!
10
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FFIEC Guidance Overview
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FFIEC Overview
• Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
comprises the following agencies:
» Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
» Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
» National Credit Union Administration
» Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
» Office of Thrift Supervision
• Mission
» Formal interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform 
principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination 
of financial institutions and to make recommendations to promote
uniformity in the supervision of financial institutions
» Established March 1979
11
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Information Technology Papers
• Authentication in an Electronic Banking 
Environment (August 2001)
• Risk Management of Free and Open Source 
Software (October 2004)
• Authentication in an Internet Banking 
Environment (October 2005)
» Supersedes 2001 Guidance
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Information Security Topics
• Other FFIEC agency papers include:
» FFIEC Information Security Handbook (November 2003)
» Guidance on Safeguarding Customers Against E-Mail and Internet 
Related Fraud (March 2004)
» Interagency Informational Brochure on Phishing Scams
(September 2004)
» Putting an End to Account- Hijacking Identity Theft (December 
2004; June 2005)
» Guidance on Mitigating Risks From Spyware (July 2005)
» Guidance on How Financial Institutions Can Protect Against 
Pharming Attacks (July 2005)
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FFIEC Guidance
• 2001 Guidance focus was risk management 
controls needed to authenticate e-banking 
customers
• Since 2001:
» More laws related to protection of customer 
information
• E.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999), Financial Data 
Protection Act (2005), California Security Breach Information 
Act (2003)
» Increased incidence of fraud and identity theft
» Better authentication technologies
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FFIEC Guidance Highlights
• Financial institutions offering Internet-based services should use effective 
methods to authenticate the identity of customers using those services.
• Single-factor authentication methodologies may not provide sufficient 
protection for Internet-based financial services.
• FFIEC agencies consider single-factor authentication, when used as the only 
control mechanism, to be inadequate for high-risk transactions involving 
access to customer information or the movement of funds to other parties. 
• Risk assessments should provide the basis for determining an effective 
authentication strategy according to the risks associated with the various 
products and services available to on-line customers. 
• Customer awareness and education should continue to be emphasized because 
they are effective deterrents to the on-line theft of assets and sensitive 
information.
• Compliance expected by end of 2006
From FFIEC, 2005
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Focus of 2005 Guidance
• 2005 Guidance focus is on three areas:
» Risk assessment
» Reliable authentication
» Customer awareness
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Risk Assessment
• Financial institutions should implement an 
ongoing risk assessment process of their Internet 
banking systems
• Evaluation factors:
» Type of customer (e.g., retail or commercial)
» Customer transactional capabilities (e.g., bill payment, 
wire transfer, or loan origination)
» Sensitivity of customer information being 
communicated
» Ease of use
» Volume of transactions
14
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Risk Assessment (2)
• Authentication methods, in particular, should be reviewed
» Single-factors (e.g., passwords and PINs) are inadequate as the 
sole authentication method for high-risk transactions
• The risk assessment process should: 
» Identify all transactions and levels of access associated with 
Internet-based customer products and services; 
» Identify and assess the risk mitigation techniques, including 
authentication methodologies, employed for each transaction type
and level of access; and
» Include the ability to gauge the effectiveness of risk mitigation 
techniques for current and changing risk factors for each 
transaction type and level of access.
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Reliable Authentication
• Authentication systems must be able to 
reliably verify the identity of the individual 
or organizational customer
» Account origination
• Particular requirement of USA PATRIOT Act
» Customer verification
• Monitoring, auditing, and reporting 
capabilities must also be in place
15
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Customer Awareness
• User education is the key defense against fraud 
and identity theft
• Financial institutions are advised to implement a 
customer awareness program
• Periodically evaluate efficacy, using such criteria 
as:
» Number of customers reporting fraud attempts
» Number of clicks on institution's security links
» Amount of educational statement stuffers or mailings
» Monetary loss due to identity theft, fraud, etc.
29© 2006, Gary C. Kessler
Authentication in Online Systems
16
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Authentication Factors
• All online authentication systems can be 
classified by the identifying factor(s) 
employed:
» Something you know
» Something you have
» Something you are
• Includes something you do
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Passwords
• Most convenient (and common) form of 
protection
» What you know vs. what you have/are
• Weakest form of protection because people 
choose bad passwords
» Names, numbers, hobbies, username, ...
» ...and you only need a few bad ones to open 
your entire system
17
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Password Limitations
• Which would you prefer?
» 6-8 characters; at least one alpha and one 
numeric; no expiration
» 6-14 characters; at least one upper case, lower 
case, number, and special character; 90-day 
expiration
• Password guessing is successful up to 90% 
of the time
Very Secure 
Passwords
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The Efficacy of Passwords
Time Required to Search All Possible Keys (at 2 million keys/sec) 
in a Brute Force attack
Characters 4-octet 5-octet 6-octet 7-octet 8-octet
Lowercase letters (26) 0.25 s 6 s 2.6 min 1.1 hr 1.2 day
Lowercase alphanumeric (36) 0.85 s 30 s 18.4 min 10.8 hr 16.2 day
All alphanumeric (62) 7.5 s 7.5 min 7.9 hr 20.3 day 3.5 yr
Printable (95) 42 s 63 min 4.3 day 1.1 yr 104.5 yr
7-bit ASCII (128) 2.3 min 4.7 hr 25.5 day 8.9 yr 1,141.5 yr
8-bit ASCII (256) 36 min 6.35 day 4.5 yr 1,141 yr 285,388 yr
Adapted from Applied Cryptography NOTE: A 1.2 GHz Pentium 
can perform 2M checks/sec.
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"What You Have" Authentication
• Based upon some item in the possession of 
the user
» Tokens
» Dongles
» One-time Passwords
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"What You Are" Authentication
• Based upon some physical characteristic of 
the user
» Biometrics
http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/products.html
19
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Biometrics
• Iris/retina scan, fingerprints/handprints, voice 
prints, DNA, face recognition, lip movement, 
signature, click rate
• These technologies are good but not perfect nor 
foolproof
» "Gattica" -- gummy bears -- "Minority Report"
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Internet Banking Authentication Taxonomy
From Hiltgen, et al., 2006
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Short-Time Password
From Hiltgen, et al., 2006
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Certificate-Based Solution
From Hiltgen, et al. (2006)
21
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Online Authentication Models
• One-time password scratch card
• One-time password tokens
• Smart cards
» Requires reader (plus drivers, proper OS...)
• Out-of-Band (OOB) Authentication
» À la confirming telephone call to complete a financial 
transaction
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Online Authentication Models
• IP address and geo-location
» Compare IP host address to customer's known 
location
» Require additional authentication information if 
questionable location
• Mutual authentication
» Based upon public-key infrastructure
» Uses SSL so that client and server can exchange 
certificates
22
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Secure Computing
• SafeWord for onlineBanking
» Two-factor authentication
» SafeWord server integrates with                
bank's applications and databases
» OTP passwords via tokens or                       
SMS messages
http://www.securecomputing.com/
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Aladdin Knowledge Systems
• eToken PRO Smartcard
» Stores user's private keys, passwords, and certificates, 
using 1024- or 2048-bit RSA authentication and digital 
signatures
» Usable with any standard smart card reader
» Two-factor authentication requires smart                  
card and password
» Provides strong authentication and                            
non-repudiation for sensitive applications such as e-
banking, e-commerce, and other financial transactions
http://aladdin.com/
23
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RSA Security
• SecurID
» Family of products providing two-factor 
authentication, using AES and RSA
• Key fob, card, PINpad and USB hardware
• Software tokens available for Windows, Pocket PC, 
PalmOS, BlackBerry, and Ericsson, Nokia, and NTT 
DoCoMo cell phones
http://www.rsasecurity.com
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PassMark Security
• Comprehensive solution to provide two-
factor, two-way authentication with minimal 
inconvenience to end user
» Designed specifically to address FFIEC 
Guidance
» Provides mechanism for server to authenticate 
client and client to authenticate server
» Two factors are a PassMark image and user's 
computer's Device ID
http://www.passmarksecurity.com/
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PassMark Authentication
• New users self-register, during which a unique Device ID is assigned 
to, and stored on, their access device (e.g., computer or PDA). 
Supplemental authentication methods include knowledge-based 
questions, and OOB email and phone confirmations
• When a user accesses the server from a known                    
computer, authentication is instantly performed                 
using PassMark image
• Self-registration is employed for each new device,                   
allowing user to employ more than one computer
• PassMark server uses heuristics to determine if an              
access attempt is "suspicious," in which case                   
additional authentication information is requested
• A deviceprint is also used to supplement the Device ID
» HTTP headers, OS registry, software configuration, IP address
» Aid in forensics and incident response
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Concluding Comments
25
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Is Cryptography the Answer?
• What problems are really solved with two-
factor authentication?
"Whoever thinks his problem can be solved 
using cryptography, doesn't understand his 
problem and doesn't understand 
cryptography."
Attributed by Roger Needham and Butler Lampson
to each other
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What Problems Will be Solved?
• Two-factor authentication "solves the security 
problems we had ten years ago, not the security 
problems we have today" (Bruce Schneier)
» Two-factor authentication, particularly when employed 
with OOB methods, can be very effective but will not 
stop phishing, identity theft, and fraud
» When we thwart one attack vector, Bad Guys merely 
shift to another
• The lesson: Don't become complacent!
26
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Two-Factor Authentication
• 2005 Guidance focuses on authentication as 
primary solution
» But does it require two-factor authentication???
• "Multifactor authentication, layered security 
or other controls reasonably calculated to 
mitigate those risks" (FFIEC, 2005, pg. 2)
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Customer Awareness Redux
• Customer awareness and education is often 
overlooked or downplayed....
• End users are the key to protecting systems
» Aware users don't give out or share their PINs, 
credit cards, tokens, etc.
• Smart users can save weak security but 
good security cannot save clueless users
27
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Summary
• Online banking: Features and risks
» Phishing demo
» DNS cache poisoning demo
• FFIEC Guidance Overview
• Authentication methods
» Two-factor authentication
» Options for online banking
• Is two-factor authentication the correct approach?
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASCII American Standard Code for Information
Interchange
ATM Automatic Teller Machine
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid
DNS Domain Name System
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council
HTTP Hypertext Transport Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
ISP Internet Service Provider
OOB Out-of-band
OS Operating system
OTP One-time password
PDA Personal digital assistant
PIN Personal Identity Number
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standard
PKI Public key infrastructure
PW Password
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SMS Short Message Service
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
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Questions? Comments? Queries?
